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Comments
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES:
A NECESSITY FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUSTICE
Sheldon Krantz*
Ralph Defendant was arrested in the middle of the night for
the murder of Sally Sly, who was allegedly his girl friend. After
police officers had continuously questioned Defendant for eight
hours at a local police station, he confessed that he had shot the
girl, and dictated a confession to a police stenographer. His apart-
ment was later searched and a pistol, shells, and bloodstained shirt
were discovered among his personal effects. All of these items
were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington,
D.C. for analysis. Two days after the confession, Richard Revenge,
identifying himself as Sally Sly's boy friend, gave the police a
signed statement to the effect that he overheard Defendant and
Sly having a violent argument two hours before her body was
found. The confession, pistol, shells, bloodstained shirt, and the
statement of Revenge are the only evidence against Defendant.
Defendant is eighteen years old and has been in the United
States only one year. He is indigent, and two months after signing
the confession, the trial court appoints counsel for him. He now
denies killing Sly and cannot remember anything that he told the
police officers. Before trial, the court-appointed counsel moves
that the prosecuting attorney produce for his inspection Defendant's
confession, pistol, shells and bloodstained shirt, or the FBI reports
on these items. He further demands the statement of Richard
Revenge. The prosecuting attorney vehemently opposes, arguing
that: (1) there is no precedent for this motion at common law;
(2) the state has no statute authorizing pretrial criminal discovery;
(3) the state has no equal method to discover evidence from a de-
fendant; and (4) that such a procedure would open the door to
perjury.
Should Ralph Defendant be allowed to inspect his own confes-
sion, the FBI reports or the items examined, and the statement of
a prosecution witness prior to trial? The purpose here is to answer
this question after examining the various policy considerations and
the present state of the law in Nebraska and other jurisdictions.
* B.S., 1960, University of Nebraska; LL.B., 1962, University of Nebraska;
Member, Nebraska State Bar Ass'n. Past editor-in-chief NEBRAsKA LAW
REViEW. Presently employed by the Criminal Division, Dep't of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
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I. HISTORY OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Pretrial discovery in criminal cases was an utter stranger to
the common law.' The leading early English case was Rex v. Hol-
land,2 where the King's Bench left no doubt that there was no right
to pretrial discovery at common law and a trial court was without
discretionary power to grant it. The rationale of the decision was
apparently the fear that any inspection of state's evidence would
"subvert the whole system of criminal law," although no reason
was given why pretrial discovery would cause this result.3 Some
limited exceptions to this rule were subsequently made by the
English courts, 4 but Holland was still the basic common law rule
when the question of pretrial discovery appeared in the United
States at the turn of this century. Our courts unhesitatingly adopted
the holding in the Holland case, expressing a similar fear of sub-
verting our criminal system.5
1 6 WIGMOaE, EVIDENCE §§ 1859(g), 1863 (3d ed. 1940). See Louisell, Crimi-
nalDiscovery; Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALiF. L. REV. 56,57 (1961);
Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV.
293, 294 (1960). For judicial discussion of the common law rule see
People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1928).
All the early cases are annotated in 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928).
2 4 Durn. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). In the Holland case,
defendant was tried in England for misappropriating funds while serving
in India in the West India Company. A board of inquiry had examined
witnesses in India and had filed a report with the attorney general in
England. One of the main reasons the defendant had asked to see the
report was because of the hardship and expense of sending for witnesses
from India.
3 In refusing the request for discovery Lord Kenyon, C.J., stated: "There
is no principle or precedent to warrant it. Nor was such a motion as the
present ever made; and if We were to grant it, it would subvert the
whole system of criminal law." Id. at 692, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249. Buller,
J., added the following comment: "The practice on common law in-
dictments, and on information on particular statutes, shews it to be
clear that this defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence, on
which the prosecution is founded, till the hour of trial." Id. at 694, 100
Eng. Rep. at 1250.
4 An exception was allowed, for example, where the exhibit requested
for inspection was the basis of the charge-the indictment was for send-
ing a threatening letter. Rex v. Harrie, 6 Car. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Rep.
1165 (1833). Also, the inspection of the contents of the stomach was
allowed defendant in a prosecution for homicide by poisoning. Rex v.
Spry, 3 Cox Cr. Cas. 221 (1848).
5 For example, in State ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135
N.W. 1128 (1912), the Minnesota Supreme Court, in denying the motion
of defendant to inspect a statement he gave to a fire marshall in advance
of trial, held: "We ought not ... establish a rule that would go far to-
ward hampering prosecuting officers in criminal trials and make convic-
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The leading early American case in pretrial discovery is People
ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,0 decided in 1928. Judge Cardozo,
speaking for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals, held that
prior to trial the defendant had no right to notes and other memo-
randa of prospective government witnesses in the hands of the
prosecuting attorney when these items would not themselves be
admissible into evidence. The point that these items might be
admissible for impeachment purposes was regarded as immaterial.
Judge Cardozo did not, however, completely foreclose the possibility
of pretrial inspection:
Her demand is that a prosecutor who has gathered statements
from prospective witnesses shall place the statements in her hands
that she may study and repel them. She does not ask that she
inspect any confession made in her name and admissible against
her. Conceivably such inspection may be necessary at times, as, for
instance, to enable a defendant to prove the forgery of a signature.7
In the thirty-five years that have passed since Lemon, and par-
ticularly in the past four years, the courts in nearly all jurisdictions
have grappled with the question of whether to allow pretrial
inspection of confessions, scientific reports and other items of evi-
dence, and statements of prospective state witnesses, with a wide
range of results occurring.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Before any conclusions can be reached on the merits of pretrial
discovery in criminal cases, the policy for or against such discovery
in criminal cases must be determined. First, it must be recognized
that at the time Rex v. Holland8 was decided, a totally different
concept of rights of an accused existed. This can be illustrated by
a statement by Stephen in his 1883 treatise, History of the Criminal
Law, as quoted by Wigmore: 9
[E]ven at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and after
the experience of the State trials held under the Stuarts, it did
not occur to the Legislature that, if a man is to be tried for his
life, he ought to know beforehand what the evidence against him is,
and that it did appear to them that to let him know even what were
the names of the witnesses was so great a favor that it ought to be
lions of the guilty exceedingly difficult." Id. at 386, 135 N.W. at 1129.
See also Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911);
Territory v. McFarlane, 7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894); Santry v.
State, 67 Wis. 65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886).
6 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1928).
7 Id. at 33, 156 N.E. at 87.
8 4 Durn. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
9 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1847 (3d ed. 1940).
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reserved for people accused of a crime for which legislators them-
selves or their friends and connections were likely to be prosecuted.
It was a matter of direct personal interest to many members of
Parliament that trials for political offenses should not be grossly
unfair; but they were comparatively indifferent as to the fate of
people accused of sheep-stealing or burglary or murder .... 10
Policy must be examined, therefore, not in terms of eighteenth
century concepts, but in light of more modern concepts of criminal
justice.
A. WHY IS PRETRIAL DIScOVERY NECESSARY?
Under our American system of criminal law, the accused is
presumed to be innocent until he has a fair opportunity to prepare
his defense and is then proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
These rights are unquestioned. It is also the duty of the state to
seek the truth rather than to achieve a record of indiscriminate
convictions by concealment and surprise." If pretrial discovery is
found to be necessary to perpetuate these principles, it should be
extended as a matter of right. The fact that the state may somehow
be burdened by displaying evidence before trial, when weighed
against the possibility that the defendant may not be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself, becomes a subordinate considera-
tion.12 The state is also heavily burdened when it must prove a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and yet the necessity
of this burden is now beyond debate. The question which must be
faced, however, is whether pretrial discovery is necessary in all or
some cases or whether some contravening public policy should
always prohibit it.
(1) Confessions
Discovery of a confession may constitute the most significant
part of the preparation of a defendant's case.13 Typically, a defense
counsel works under a serious handicap. He usually comes into a
case after the confession was given. The state has already ac-
complished a type of discovery by obtaining the confession. By the
time counsel sees the defendant, the latter has likely forgotten much
10 This is not meant to infer that our present system of criminal justice is
beyond reproach. Even today a federal criminal defendant in other than
capital cases is not entitled to a list of witnesses against him in advance
of trial.
11 A.B.A., Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5.
12 Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); Com-
ment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1063
(1961); Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, supra note
1, at 312.
13- Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 12, at 1055.
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of the essential information that he gave the police. On the other
hand, the state has usually gathered all of its evidence, and defense
counsel now has limited means of gaining necessary information.
For these reasons alone, it would seem only fair that defense counsel
be allowed to inspect the confession.
If there is any question as to whether the confession was invol-
untary, the signature forged, or defendant was mentally incompe-
tent at the time the confession was given, defense counsel should
have an opportunity to check out these possibilities as a matter of
right. Otherwise, a defendant could be convicted on fraudulent
evidence. Defense counsel will rarely have sufficient time during
trial to check out these possibilities unless there is substantial delay.
Probably the most significant reason for pretrial discovery of a
confession is its effect on a jury.14 When a jury hears a defendant
carefully recreate the details of a hideous crime, little else is remem-
bered. This was succinctly stated by the New Jersey court in
State v. Johnson:15
We must be mindful of the role of a confession. It frequently
becomes the core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for thejudicial proceeding to become more of a review of what transpired
at headquarters than a trial of the basic criminal event itself. No
one would deny a defendant's right thoroughly to investigate the
facts of the crime to prepare for trial of that event. When a con-
fession is given and issues surrounding it tend to displace the
criminal event as the focus of the trial, there should be like oppor-
tunity to get at the facts of the substituted issue. Simple justice
requires that a defendant be permitted to prepare to meet what
thus looms as the critical element of the case against him.
For any of the above reasons, it appears clear that the discovery
of a confession prior to trial is necessary to enable defense counsel
to properly prepare his defense.
(2) Items of Evidence and Scientific Reports
In many cases the most damaging evidence against defendant
are the fingerprints on a weapon, a scientific report on bloodstains,
a ballistics test or an autopsy report. Even if these reports may not
be admissible at trial, their results often prove innocence as well
as guilt, and for that reason, may be quite vital to the defense for
impeachment purposes. The state has unlimited access to modern
scientific aids and it is making more and more use of these devices.
The defendant, on the other hand, is often indigent and generally
cannot afford to make independent tests on his own. Grave injustice
may be done if scientific studies which tend to show innocence are
14 Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, supra note 1, at 306.
15 28 N.J. 133, 137, 145 A.2d 313, 316 (1958).
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never made known to defense counsel and are never introduced at
trial. Because of the great probative value of such tests or reports
and because of the extreme difficulty and expense of private dupli-
cation, such reports ought to be freely discoverable.1" If a report or
an item of evidence is the essence of a case, it would seem particu-
larly unfair to withhold its access from the defendant.
In most cases, these reports or tests are complex and require
expert analysis. Unless counsel has sufficient time before trial to
examine these materials, he will be at a severe disadvantage on
cross-examination as he will not be familiar enough with the sub-
ject matter.17
(3) Witness Statements
Obtaining the statements of prospective state witnesses before
trial may also be essential to the preparation of a defendant's case.
The value of such inspection rests primarily in checking out the
validity of a statement in order that defense counsel may intelli-
gently impeach the witness on cross-examination. If counsel has
sufficient time to do some checking, he may find gross exaggera-
tions or outright fabrication which he might not have been able to
discover if not allowed to see the statement until after direct exam-
ination of the witness.
The state should never be allowed to convict a defendant on
untrustworthy evidence. If the statements are trustworthy, the
state should have no fear of turning them over for a defendant's
inspection.'8
Thus, it can be seen that there are strong policy grounds for
pretrial discovery of witness' statements. Probably the best expres-
sion of this policy was enunciated by the California court in Cash v.
Superior Court:19
The basis for requiring pre-trial production of material in the
hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an
accused is entitled to a fair trial .... In other words, although
there is a possibility that a defendant may be acting in bad faith
and may be seeking merely to acquire advance knowledge of the
details of the prosecution's case with a view to shaping his defense
accordingly, such a possibility is subordinate in importance to the
10 Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 12, at 1061.
17 Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); State ex rel.
Wagner v. Circuit Court of Minnehaha County, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W.
100 (1932).
18 Arens & Meadows, Psycholinguistics and the Confession Dilemma, 56
COLum. L. REv. 19 (1956). See People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.
2d 1 (1957).
19 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959).
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danger of convicting the innocent and does not warrant denying a
request for production where there is a sufficient showing that the
request should be granted in the interests of a fair trial.
If the goal of criminal prosecutions is to determine the truth,
then pretrial discovery is necessary to give a defendant equal op-
portunity to discover the truth. Many courts argue, however, that
pretrial discovery by a defendant will in many cases result in more
harm than good. These arguments will now be analyzed.
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRETRIAL DIsCOVERY
The arguments against pretrial discovery have been so vehe-
ment by some courts that they deserve serious scrutiny.
(1) Pretrial discovery will lead to perjury and the suppression of
evidence.
The argument most often employed for denying pretrial dis-
covery is that once a defendant has access to evidence prior to trial
he will use perjury and other devious means to meet the evidence.
Probably the strongest advocate of this view was Justice Vander-
bflt: 20
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts
that often discovery will not lead to honest fact-finding, but on the
contrary to perjury and the suppression of evidence. Thus the
criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will often
procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense....
Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defend-
ant who is informed of the names of all the State's witnesses may
take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony
or in absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify.
Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will
have knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to
come forward with information during the investigation of the
crime.... All these dangers are more inherent in criminal proceed-
ings where the defendant has much more at stake, often his own
life, than in civil proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal
proceedings today is extensive despite the efforts of the courts to
eradicate it and constitutes a very serious threat to the administra-
tion of criminal justice and thus to the welfare of the country as a
whole .... To permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and
information in the hands of the State would go far beyond what is
required in civil cases; it would defeat the very ends of justice.
This argument would be tremendously persuasive if every de-
fendant were guilty and would engage in perjury. However, this
is certainly not the case, and "the possibility that a dishonest ac-
cused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing
the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clear-
20 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
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ing himself."2' 1 There is no evidence that present methods of im-
peachment are inadequate to uncover perjured testimony. No
proof has been forthcoming to show that jurisdictions with liberal
discovery procedures have been swamped by perjury.
Even if it be conceded that defendants will commit perjury to
save themselves, do they really have an adequate opportunity to
do so? In regard to confessions, little opportunity for perjury is
possible. Since the state already has the confession, the oppor-
tunity for impeachment would negate any opportunity for fabri-
cation.2 2 The possibility of perjury is even smaller in the discovery
of scientific reports and items of evidence. Items of evidence are
unchangeable, except by destruction or wilful alteration, and these
acts can be prevented by proper supervision. 23 Scientific reports
are likewise incapable of being refuted by perjury or subjected to
tampering.24 There is no reason, therefore, why confessions or scien-
tific data should ever be withheld because of a fear of perjury.
It may be true, however, that discovery of statements of state
witnesses may create the possibility of perjury or even the refusal
of a witness to testify because of bribery or intimidation. One
leading author has opined that the only time there is a danger of
threats to witnesses and/or hired perjurers is when a criminal syn-
dicate is involved and that this problem is, in actuality, nonexistent
in the typical crime in a state court such as a passion killing.2 5 He
concludes, therefore, that the burden should be placed on the state
to show that such an unusual threat is possible. This may be plac-
ing too great a burden on the prosecution, however. Possibly
a better result would be to favor pretrial discovery of witness'
statements in most cases, but to allow a trial court wide discretion
to refuse to allow discovery when the public interest so dictates.
21 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863 at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
22 Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 12, at 1054.
23 United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922).
24 People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
25 Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, supra note 1
at 100: "Rather, it would seem that the law should take account of these
realities, and draw the line between typical, and organized crime. In
the usual criminal case, the norm would be discovery as full-fledged
as that which now characterizes civil litigation in federal courts and
those many jurisdictions which have emulated the federal civil discov-
ery rules. Discovery, however, would be withheld, or perhaps allowed
subject to restrictions, upon a showing by the state that by reasons of
the nature of the accused's associations and representatives, it would
likely lead to improper uses such as threats to witnesses, hired or pro-
fessional perjury, or the like."
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(2) Defendants in criminal cases already have an unfair advan-
tage, and pretrial discovery would only increase this imbalance.
Several courts have expressed the view that criminal defend-
ants already have too much of an edge, and the granting of pretrial
discovery would only increase the advantage. The point is made
that a defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
that a jury of twelve must unanimously find a defendant guilty,
that a defendant does not have to take the stand unless he so desires,
and that he can introduce any unforseeable evidence he desires in
his own defense. Judge Learned Hand's statement in United States
v. Garsson,6 is the most famous expression of this view:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not dis-
close the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question
or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted where there is
the least doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in
addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him
to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully,
I have never been able to see.... Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the
watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecu-
tion of crime.2 7
First, the contended advantage that a criminal defendant has
is undoubtedly exaggerated, particularly in state cases.2 8 To say
that the few constitutional safeguards granted to an accused over-
whelm the combined investigative facilities at the hands of the
state is unrealistic. But even if it were conceded that a defendant
has some sort of advantage, this is no reason to deny pretrial discov-
ery. Questions of procedural rights should not turn principally on
questions of relative advantage since the aim of criminal procedure
ought not be conviction, but rather justice through full disclosure
of the truth.29 At early common law, criminal litigation was equated
to a game and it was considered unsportsmanlike for one adversary
to have to disclose his evidence.3 0 But this theory has no place in
modern procedure. The important consideration must be the fer-
reting out of truth. There is no sound reason for the state to with-
26 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
27 Id. at 649.
28 Comment, supra note 12, at 1063.
29 Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); 6 WiG-
moRE, EvimENC § 1863 (3d ed. 1940); Louisell, supra note 1, at 102.
30 6 WiGmoRS, EvmiENCE § 1845 (3d ed. 1940).
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hold inspection of evidence except when serious prejudice can be
shown.
(3) Pretrial discovery in criminal cases will subvert the whole
criminal system.
This argument was used in the early cases but no reasons were
given why such a danger would result from discovery. 31 Appar-
ently, this argument was used whenever any advantage was taken
away from the old method of "trial by ambush. ' 32 Initially, a de-
fendant could not call witnesses in his own behalf and he had no
privilege against self-incrimination. Changes in these procedures
have not subverted the entire criminal system, and there is no rea-
son why pretrial discovery would have this effect.
(4) The crime rate has increased so rapidly that we must tighten
our criminal procedures instead of liberalizing them.
One of the reasons asserted by the New Jersey Superior Court,
in State v. Tune,33 for denying discovery was that crime was on the
upswing in that state and steps had to be taken to reverse the trend.
This reasoning was rejected in a dissent in the Tune case,34 and by
the majority in the later case of State v. Johnson.35 Both rebuked
this reasoning on the grounds that: (1) discovery procedure has
nothing to do with increased crime rates, and (2) the fact that crime
is increasing is no basis to presume that every defendant is guilty.
The reasoning carried to its extreme that the denial of pretrial
discovery would reduce crime, would justify police brutality and
mandatory self-incrimination to guarantee a conviction in every
case.
(5) Since the right against self-incrimination prevents the state
from any discovery of an accused's case, the state should have
the same protection.
31 Rex v. Holland, 4 Durn. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792); State
ex rel. Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 284, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912).
32 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863 (3d ed. 1940).
33 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
34 Id. at 227, 98 A.2d at 894. A/fr. Justice Brennen's sarcastic remarks are
worthy of mention: "That old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with
every suggested change in procedure to make easier the discovery of the
truth, is again disinterred from the grave where I had thought it was
forever buried under the overwhelming weight of the complete rebuttal
supplied by our experience in civil causes where liberal discovery has
been allowed."
35 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
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The case most often cited to support this proposition is an early
Ohio case, State v. Rhoads,36 where the court stated:
The state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit his
private papers or memoranda to the state for use or even examina-
tion, for he cannot be required to testify in the case, nor to furnish
evidence against himself. Then, why should the accused be allowed
to rummage through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney?
Neither the sublime teachings of the Golden Rule to which we have
been referred nor the supposed sense of fair play, can be so per-
verted as to sanction the demands allowed in this case.
Again, this argument presumes that a criminal case is somewhat
like a contest, in which each contestant must start out on an equal
footing. The argument is emasculated by the California Supreme
Court in Cash v. Superior Court 7
In Powell v Superior Court ... it was noted that an accused was
denied production at early common law because he might fabricate
evidence to meet the state's case and because the prosecution did
not have a reciprocal right in view of the privilege against self-
incrimination. In granting relief, however, this court pointed out
that to deny production on the ground that an imbalance would be
created between the advantages of prosecution and defense would
be to lose sight of the purpose of a trial, which is the ascertainment
of truth, that nondisclosure partakes of the nature of a game; and
that the state is so solicitous of according a defendant a fair trial
that it will not hinder him in the preparation of his defense by de-
priving him of competent material and relevant evidence.
There is also some doubt as to how effective the right against
self-incrimination is in many cases. Often, the state already has a
defendant's confession and several states require that a defendant
specially plead his defenses of alibi and insanity.3 8
After close scrutiny of these various arguments, it is apparent
that there is no strong policy for denying pretrial discovery in
criminal cases. It is conceded that in some cases, such as where
there is an apparent threat to state witnesses, discovery should be
denied; but these instances are few. When such a case arises, it
can be handled by giving a trial judge discretion to deny dis-
covery when, in his opinion, discovery would be detrimental to
the public interest.
36 81 Ohio St. 397, 425, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
37 53 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407, 408 (1959).
38 Louisell, Criminal Discovery; Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 56, 90 (1961); Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
HAnv. L. REv. 940, 1062 (1962).
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III. THE EFFECT OF LIBERAL PRETRIAL DISCOVERY METH-
ODS IN MILITARY COURTS AND THE ENGLISH CRIM-
INAL SYSTEM.
The arguments that liberal pretrial discovery will result in
substantial harm to effective criminal administration can also be
effectively refuted by showing the success of liberal discovery in
other jurisdictions. Contrary to the many fears raised, liberal pre-
trial discovery, where used, has been praised by prosecution and
defense alike.
A. MILITARY PROCEEDINGS
The prevailing attitude in military justice is that a defendant
be given every possible aid by the prosecution.3 9 Access to gov-
ernment experts prior to trial is unobstructed.40 A defendant has
an absolute right, at government expense, to reports of psychiatrists,
chemists and ballistics experts, among others.41 A defendant also
has an absolute right to all evidentiary items, e.g., the murder
weapon. 42 Confessions are turned over as a matter of right and
statements of informers or other witnesses are given to a defendant
upon any showing of materiality. The success of this liberality is
clearly illustrated by the following observation.43
What I have described is, in fact, an open government file, in
rather startling contrast to civilian practice where some widening
of traditionally narrow pretrial area has been causing comment in
the literature. Apparently Judge Learned Hand's remarks attract
fewer adherents. That the ends of justice would be subverted by
giving such "ammunition" to a defendant has been an oft-expressed
fear. I cannot tell you how much perjury or coercion of witnesses
is caused by this wide open policy. I can state to you that when
I thought I had detected evidence of either, it seemed to me not
to have sprung from or been discouraged by, any particular revela-
tion of Government evidence before or at trial. Additionally, police
and investigative powers in the Army are, to say the least, com-
petent to deal with this form of threat if, in fact, it is real. Indeed,
I have wondered if perjury would not be more likely where an ac-
cused "was in the dark" so to speak with regard to possible re-
buttal evidence in the hands of the prosecutor.
39 Keogh, Military Indictment or Presentment, The Investigation, and
Decision to Try by Court-Martial, American Bar Association Panel
Discussion on Pretrial Procedures and Discovery in Courts-Martial and
the Civil Courts-A Comparison (American Bar Association 84th Annual
Meeting, August 9, 1961).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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B. ENGLISH PROCEEDINGS
The English system of criminal procedure has progressed im-
measurably since the days of Rex v. Holland.44 The English courts
still do not employ a discovery device as such, but their present
pretrial procedures may even excel pretrial discovery in fairness
to the defendant.
In England,45 every indictable offense (with some exceptions
not important to this discussion) must be initially investigated at a
preliminary hearing. At this hearing all the evidence to be intro-
duced at the trial must be introduced in the presence of the ac-
cused.40 Each witness who will testify on behalf of the state at the
trial must divulge all his information at the preliminary investi-
gation, and he may be cross-examined by defense counsel.47 This
testimony is recorded, and after it is read back to the witness and
he approves it, it becomes his deposition.48 Copies of this deposition
are then made available to a defendant if he is subsequently com-
mitted for trial.49 A defendant also has the opportunity to present
his case at this investigation, but because his evidence will be
reduced to writing and available at trial, he rarely does so.50 One
obvious shortcoming of this system is that the prosecution can still
withhold damaging evidence because only that evidence which will
be used at the trial need be disclosed at the preliminary investiga-
tion. This procedure, taken as a whole, however, is extremely fair
to a defendant because there is little opportunity for surprise at
trial, and a defendant is given an adequate opportunity to prepare
his defense.
The fact that the American military and English criminal law
systems have been liberalized in an effort to assist a defendant,
without any apparent ill effects, greatly strengthens the case for
liberal pretrial discovery. It also casts doubt on the oft-heard
expression that American courts are world leaders in fair criminal
procedure. This will be further illustrated by the following sec-
tion which shows the present state of the law in American jurisdic-
tions.
44 4 Durn. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792).
45 VGISTRATES' COURTS ACT, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §§ 4-12,
[hereinafter cited as MAGISTRATES' CouRTs ACT].
46 MAGISTRATES' COURTS ACT § 4(3).
47 THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS RuLEs, 1952, Rule 5 (1).
48 Ibid.
49 TH MAGISTRATES' COURTS RULEs, 1952, Rule 13.
50 Louisell, supra note 38, at 65.
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IV. THE PRESENT LAW OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN
AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS
A. THE FEDERAL LAW
Procedure in federal criminal cases is governed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated in 1946 in an attempt to,
procedurally at least, give defendants a fair trial. Discovery pro-
cedures are governed by Rules 16 and 17 (c). Rule 16 provides:
Upon a motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for
the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible ob-
jects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from
others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items
sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that
the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or
photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
just.
As Rule 16 vests a discretionary power in the court to grant
inspection, 1 it would appear that this rule would serve as a
vehicle to extensive pretrial discovery equal to that authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any hope that the criminal
rules would be as liberal as the civil rules, however, has long since
vanished. A close reading of Rule 16 indicates that inspection may
be granted only as to those documents "obtained from or belonging
to" the defendant or "obtained from others by seizure or by process."
Although there has been some conflict in the various district
courts as to whether Rule 16 would allow a defendant to inspect
his own statement prior to trial,5 2 a recent Court of Appeals case
has clearly stated that a confession or statement could not be in-
spected prior to trial under Rule 16. In United States v. Murray,5 3
the court held: 54
We hold that a transcription of a question and answer examination
of one who later becomes a defendant in a criminal action is not
discoverable by him under Rule 16 as within the category of
"books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or
belonging to the defendant." The language of Rule 16, its evolution
51 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951); United States
v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also Kauffman, Criminal
Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal
Courts, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1113 (1957).
52 A list of these cases can be found in United States v. Fancher, 195 F.
Supp. 448 (D. Conn. 1961).
53 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962).
54 Id. at 820.
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in the Advisory Committee ... and the Committee's final explana-
tory Note all indicate that Rule 16 applies only to books, papers,
documents or tangible objects in which a defendant has had some
prior proprietary or possessory interest. The great weight of author-
ity supports our unwillingness to stretch the word "belonging" to
the point of saying that a stenographic transcript of a defendant's
words "belongs" to him .... Although Murray's Q-and-A statements
were not signed, we can see no reason why a signed statement
would anymore have "belonged" to him within the meaning of the
rule.
Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, it is also apparent
that a defendant would not be able to inspect any scientific reports
prepared by the government.
Neither does a defendant have much opportunity to pretrial
discovery under Rule 17 (c). This rule provides:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed
to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify
the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.
The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time
prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered
in evidence and may upon their production permit the books,
papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected
by the parties and their attorneys.
There was some early hope that Rule 17 (c) would be construed
somewhat more broadly than Rule 16, and as such, would be a useful
discovery device. The Supreme Court in Bowman Dairy Co. v.
United States55 held that any document or other materials, admis-
sible as evidence, obtained by the government by solicitation or
voluntarily from third persons, was subject to subpoena. The
Court stated that although Rule 16 was not intended to give such
a right of discovery, Rule 17 (c) does so since: 56
There may be documents and other materials in the possession of
the Government not subject to Riqle 16. No good reason appears to
us why they may not be reached by subpoena under Rule 17 (c) as
long as they are evidentiary.
The courts, since Bowman, however, have held that Rule 17 (c) does
not provide an additional means of discovery not available under
Rule 16. In United States v. Murray,57 for example, the court re-
fused to allow the inspection of a defendant's statement under Rule
17 (c) and stated that the mere likelihood that the government will
55 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951).
56 Id. at 219.
57 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962).
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use a defendant's statement as evidence does not make it eviden-
tiary within the meaning of Rule 17(c): 58
If Rule 17(c) is interpreted to allow the defense to inspect any
matter in the government hands which might be used by it as
evidence, we see little meaning left in the court's clear statement
in Bowman that it is not an additional discovery device. Rather
we interpret Bowman as saying that Rule 17(c) is a device solely
for the obtaining of evidence for the use of the moving party, per-
mitting him to examine the material obtained before trial only
where, in the discretion of the court, it is necessary that he do
so in order to make use of the material as evidence.
The only apparent evidentiary use to which a defendant could
put his own statement would be to impeach the testimony of a
government witness about its contents or, perhaps, to bolster his
own testimony by showing its consistency with the prior statement
in the event that the government introduced evidence of some other
inconsistent statement. To be sure, we see no reason why after the
government introduces such testimony at trial a defendant could
not use Rule 17 (c) to subpoena his prior statement for his own use.
Thus it seems obvious that Rules 16 and 17 (c) must be amended
if they are ever to be effective in granting a defendant pretrial dis-
covery of his own statements or of scientific reports.5 9
The question of whether or not a defendant can inspect the
statements of government witnesses in a federal court proceeding
has had a tortured history. Prior to 1957, the rule in the federal
courts was that a defendant could not inspect the statements of gov-
ernment witnesses for impeachment purposes until he could show
an inconsistency between the testimony of the witness and the con-
tents of his statement.60 This rule was foolish because a defendant
had no way of ascertaining whether there was an inconsistency as
he never had an opporunity to examine the statement,0 1 and it was
completely laid to rest in 1957 by the now famous case of Jencks v.
United States. 2 The United States Supreme Court held in Jencks
that at the time of cross-examination the defense was entitled to
relevant statements made by government agents without showing
58 Id. at 821.
59 Comment, supra note 12, at 1053, 1061.
60 Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953). Mr. Justice Brennen denied
that Gordon stood for this rule in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957), but the lower federal courts interpreted Gordon in that manner.
See, e.g., Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955).
61 "Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement
of its contents or applicability can be expected from the person who
claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?" United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (C.C.D.Va. 1807), quoted by Mr. Justice
Brennen in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957).
02 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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any inconsistency and without prior inspection by the trial court
to determine whether an inconsistency in fact existed. The govern-
ment might refuse the demand for production, but at the expense of
dismissal of its case.
This liberal criminal discovery procedure lasted only three
months. Congress, probably out of fear that the Supreme Court had
opened the government files "to the criminal and thus afforded
him a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential informa-
tion,"63 enacted what is now known as the Jencks Act.0 4 In essence,
the Jencks Act provides: (1) no report or statement made by a gov-
ernment witness is subject to discovery and inspection until after
that witness has testified on direct examination at trial; (2) after
the direct examination, the defendant may move to inspect that
part of the statement or report which relates to the testimony of
the witness; (3) if the United States objects to production of a state-
ment or report on the grounds that it does not relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness, then the court will examine
the statement in camera and excise those portions not relating to
the subject matter. "Statement" was defined in the act to mean:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or other-
wise adopted by him; or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital
of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the
Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making
of such oral statement. 65
The Jencks Act was judicially construed by the Supreme Court
for the first time in Palermo v. United States.6 i Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority, stated that the terms of the act
provided the only method of inspection of statements of govern-
ment witnesses, and therefore no statement can be obtained until
after that witness testifies at the trial. Also, the Court held that
under the act's definition of "statement," a defendant can never
obtain resumes, summaries or condensations of witness' statements.
The result of the Jencks Act and its judicial construction by the
Supreme Court is that there is now no opportunity for pretrial dis-
covery of a government witness' statement at all, and no oppor-
tunity, as a practical matter, to get anything but a signed state-
63 Mr. Justice Clark dissenting in Jencks at 681-82.
64 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1958).
65 Ibid.
06 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
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ment of a witness during trial, since verbatim reports, transcriptions
and recordings will probably be non-existent.
Thus, federal criminal procedure, supposedly the pacesetter for
liberal criminal procedure, has taken a serious step backward in
discovery methods. Add to this the fact that a defendant can rarely
inspect his own confession or scientific reports prior to trial, and
the result appears to be that criminal pretrial discovery in the fed-
eral courts is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. This is truly
an anomaly, for discovery procedure under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is ever expanding. It would appear that this lib-
erality should certainly extend to criminal cases where error in
result is far more serious to the parties involved.
B. THE STATE LAW
(1) State Statutes
Seven states have enacted statutes dealing with pretrial dis-
covery or an aspect of it. Four states, Arizona,67 Idaho,Gs Mary-
land,69 and Vermont 70 have adopted statutes identical in nearly
every respect to Federal Rule 16. These statutes are as useless as
the federal rule since they do not authorize pretrial inspection of
confessions, scientific reports, or tests and statements of prosecu-
tion witnesses.71 Two states, New Jersey72 and Delaware, have
also adopted the federal rule but have added provisions somewhat
expanding discovery. New Jersey allows a trial judge to authorize
discovery of the confession or statement of defendant if justice so
requires, and Delaware allows discovery of confessions and state-
ments of co-defendants. Thus, these two states, at least, have had
the foresight to recognize some of the shortcomings of Rule 16, but
they, too, still have avoided the problem of scientific reports or evi-
dentiary items.
The other states, Illinois 74 and Florida,75 have unique statutes.
Illinois has recently enacted a statute requiring that a confession
07 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 195 (1956).
0 IDAHO CODE ANN. § R19-1530 (Supp. 1961).
09 Mi. ANN. CODE, Rules of Proc., Rule 728 (1957).
70 VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13 § 6721 (Supp. 1961).
71 This is assuming that these state courts give their statutes the same
construction that the federal rule was given.
72 N.J. Court Rules 3:5-11 (1958).
73 Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.) R. 16, 17(c) (1953).
74 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 729 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1961).
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.18 (1959).
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will not be admissible at a trial unless a copy of it was given to the
defendant prior to trial. It provides as follows:
Whenever a written or oral confession shall have been made before
any law enforcement officer or agency in this State by any person
charged with any crime, a copy of such confession, if written, to-
gether with a list of the names and addresses of all persons present
at the time such confession was made shall be given to the de-
fendant or his counsel prior to arraignment, or at such later time
as the court, in its discretion, may direct, upon motion by either the
prosecution or defense at the time of arraignment. If such confess-
sion was not reduced to writing, then a list of the names and ad-
dresses of all persons present at the time the confession was made
shall be furnished. If the confession is made between the arraign-
ment and the time the case is set for hearing, such fact shall be
grounds for a continuance of the case on motion of either party, and
the confession shall thereafter be furnished as aforesaid. No con-
fession shall be admitted as evidence unless the confession and/or
list of names and addresses of persons present at the time the con-
fession was made is furnished as required by this Section:'6
This statute appears to create an effective method of compelling
the state to furnish confessions, but it has not yet been tested.
Florida, on the other hand, has a statute which does not cover
confessions but does cover scientific reports and tests and eviden-
tiary items: 7
When a crime has been committed and the evidence of the state
shall relate to ballistics, fingerprints, blood, semen, or other stains,
or documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects,
or other tangible things, upon motion showing good cause therefor,
and upon notice to the prosecuting attorney, the court in which
the action is pending, whether the committing magistrate's court
or the court having jurisdiction to try the cause, may order the
state to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photo-
graphing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or other tan-
gible things. In examinations to be conducted by representatives
of the state as to ballistics, fingerprints, blood, semen, and other
stains, the defendant, upon motion and notice, as aforesaid shall be
permitted under order of court, to. be present, or have present, an
expert of his own selection, during the course of such examination.
The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making
the inspection and taking the copies and photographs, and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
It is quite possible that this statute will be strictly construed.
As written, it does not authorize inspection of scientific reports
made, but only allows a defendant to be present when the tests are
being prepared. What happens if a defendant is not yet represented
by counsel when the examination is performed? Can he later get
70 Id. § 909.19 (1959).
77Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
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the report of the examination? One Florida case, Ezzel v. State,78
refused to turn over to a defendant an outline of the testimony to be
given at trial by a ballistics expert. The gun and bullets were, how-
ever, ordered produced. A 1957 Attorney General's Opinion indi-
cated that a defendant has no right to a copy of a drunkometer
report showing the result of an examination of a motorist after he
was arrested for drunken driving.79 Thus, this statute, too, ap-
parently is going to be so strictly construed that it will lose its
effectiveness.
None of the statutes deal with all discovery problems and only
the Illinois and Florida statutes deal with any one of the problems
with any hope of success.
(2) STATE CASES
State courts are hopelessly split as to whether a defendant has
the right to pretrial discovery. Several states have unequivocally
denied a defendant in a criminal case any right to pretrial dis-
covery. 0 The reason generally given for this outright prohibition
is that there was no right to such discovery at common law and
78 Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956).
79 Ops. Fla. Att'y Gen. 057-78 (1957).
80 Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); Mendelsohn v.
People, 143 Colo. 397, 353 P.2d 587 (1960); Walker v. State, 215 Ga.
128, 109 S.E.2d 748 (1959); Martin v. State, 96 Ga. App. 557, 100 S.E.2d
645 (1957); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1957); Kinder
v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); Wendling v. Common-
wealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911); Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333
Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 857 (1956);
Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2d 382 (1938); Com-
monwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911); State ex rel.
Robertson v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912); Territory v.
McFarlane, 7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894); State v. Sharp, 162 Ohio St.
173, 122 N.E.2d 684 (1954); State v. Potts, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 77, 124 N.E.2d
180 (Ct. App. 1953); State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3
(1925). But see, State v. Regedanz, 54 Ohio Op. 76, 120 N.E.2d 480
(C.P. 1953); State v. Major, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 271, 101 N.E.2d 397 (C.P.
1950); State v. Cala, 20 Ohio Op. 400, 35 N.E.2d 758 (C.P. 1940); Ivey
v. State, 207 Tenn. 438, 34 S.W.2d 907 (1960); Bass v. State, 191 Tenn.
259, 231 S.W.2d 707 (1950); Freeman v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317
S.W.2d 726 (1958); Hill v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 229, 319 S.W.2d 318
(1958); Dowling v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 43, 317 S.W.2d 533 (1958);
Pettigrew v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 194, 289 S.W.2d 935 (1956); Lopez v.
State, 158 Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W.2d 701 (1952); Smith v. State, 156
Tex. Crim. 253, 240 S.W.2d 783 (1951); Board v. State, 122 Tex. Crim.
487, 56 S.W.2d 464 (1933); Taylor v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 330, 221 S.W.
611 (1919); State v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 116 Wis. 2d 197, 114
N.W.2d 114 (1962); State v. Herman, 219 Wis. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935);
State v. Page, 206 Wis. 611, 240 N.W. 173 (1932).
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the courts are powerless to act in the absence of remedial legisla-
tion."' This reasoning must be questioned in light of the fact that
nearly all jurisdictions, including the federal courts, have adopted
the view that a trial judge has inherent power to order discovery,
even in the absence of statute, when justice so requires. 82 Other
reasons given for a complete denial of pretrial discovery have even
less validity: once pretrial discovery in any form is approved by
the courts, the floodgates will swing open to unlimited discovery
of all the state's evidence;8 3 the state will be placed at an unfair
disadvantage;8 4 the state's evidence is privileged as "work-prod-
uct,"8 5 and the present procedure of denying discovery has worked
well in the past so there is no need for change. 6 All of these argu-
ments fail to analyze fairness to the defendant, his need for pretrial
discovery and whether or not there is any actual harm to the state.8 7
The remainder of the states accept the fact that trial judges do
have inherent power to permit discovery in certain cases. The ques-
tions then arise as to when this power can be exercised and as to
what the scope of review by appellate courts should be. Because
confessions, scientific reports and witness' statements have been
81 See, e.g., Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 162, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952):
"It is readily apparent, however, that the tools of equity are in no wise
fitted to the mechanics of the trial of a criminal case. The doctrine of
discovery is therefore a complete and utter stranger to criminal pro-
cedure, unless introduced by appropriate legislation." See also Walker
v. State, 215 Ga. 128, 109 S.E.2d 748 (1959); State ex rel. Robertson v.
Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912); Territory v. McFarlane,
7 N.M. 421, 37 Pac. 1111 (1894); State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 421, 147
N.E. 3 (1925); Dowling v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 43, 317 S.W.2d 533
(1958).
82 Supra note 81. Also, a recent federal case, United States v. Murray,
297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1962), while refusing to grant discovery under
Rules 16 and 17(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, admitted
that the trial judge has the discretion to do so.
83 Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 163, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952): "It takes
little imagination to visualize the extremity to which such 'prowling'
might be extended should opportunity be afforded, and the serious
effect that might result therefrom."; State v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384,
386, 135 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1912): "[Blut if the practice be once adopted
that an indicted person is entitled to be furnished with some evidence
in the possession of the county attorney, where is the line to be drawn?"
84 United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
85 State v. Zimnaruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20 A.2d 613 (1941); Lopez v. State,
158 Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W.2d 701 (1952).
86 Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955).
87 Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v. Thompson, 54
Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
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handled quite differently by the states, each will be dealt with
separately.
(1) Confessions
Probably the greatest advance in pretrial discovery has evolved
in the area of confession, particularly within the past few years.88
There is still no consistent policy, however, as to what the rule
should be. One state, Louisiana, has held that under the state due
process clause, a defendant must be given a pretrial inspection of
his own confession.8 9 No other state, however, has placed pretrial
discovery on constitutional grounds, and the United States Supreme
Court has held on two separate occasions that there is no federal
constitutional right to a pretrial inspection of a confession." Within
the past four years, California has decided that a defendant has
nearly an absolute right to inspect his own confession upon prac-
tically any showing of need,9' and several other states have held
that discovery of a confession should always be granted unless
special circumstances exist.9 2 A few courts seem to indicate that
inspection of a confession should be allowed as a matter of right
when there is a question as to a forged signature93 or the mental
capacity of the defendant at the time the confession was given.9 4
88 State v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956); Powell v.
Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); State v. Minor, 177
A.2d 215 (Del. 1962); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739(1959); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v.
Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
89 State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945). But it is interesting
to note that this requirement ceases if the state does not plan to rely on
or offer the confession at trial. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So. 2d 333
(1954).
90 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952). In Leland, the Court held: "While it may be the better
practice for the prosecution thus to exhibit a confession, failure to do
so in this case in no way denied appellant a fair trial." Id. at 801.
91 Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); People
v. Garner, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680 (1961); McCarthy v. Superior
Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 755, 328 P.2d 819 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Mc-
Allister v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 2d 297, 331 P.2d 654 (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773(1958); Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 327 P.2d 68 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Cordy v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 267, 326
P.2d 222 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
92 See note 87 supra.
93 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84,(1927); Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944).
94 Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944).
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The majority rule still seems to be, however, that whether or
not a confession can be inspected depends on the discretion of the
trial judge, and his discretion will not be overturned unless a clear
abuse is shown.9 5 In some states this rule of discretion is equivalent
to outright prohibition because the trial courts have never au-
thorized inspection and apparently will never do so until they are
given statutory or appellate direction6
(2) Items of Evidence and Scientific Reports
The rules for discovery of items of evidence and scientific re-
ports are as varied as the rules governing confessions. Louisiana,
for example, which declared that a defendant had a constitutional
right to inspect his confession, has held that he cannot discover
anything else.9 7 New York, on the other hand, which seldom
allows inspection of a confession, has held that a scientific report
would be discoverable as a matter of course since it is not subject
to tampering or refutation by perjury. 8 Rhode Island has indicated
that an autopsy report is one of few items that might be discover-
able.09 Eight states have now reached the stage where trial judges
frequently allow inspection of scientific reports in the furtherance
of justice.10 0 Several other states deny the right, either absolutely,10 1
93 State v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1957); State ex Tel.
Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224, 153 A.2d 403 (1959); Weer v.
State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941); State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51
A.2d 647 (1947); Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944);
Pinana v. State, 352 P.2d 824 (Nev. 1960); People v. D'Andrea, 20 Misc.
2d 1070, 195 N.Y.S.2d 542 (King's County Ct. 1960); State v. Thompson,
54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959); State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227
P.2d 785 (1951).
90 Weer v. State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941); Cramer v. State, 145
Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944); Pinana v. State, 352 P.2d 824 (Nev. 1960);
State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951).
97 State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954).
98 People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
09 State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 195 Atl. 497 (1937).
100 United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922); State ex tel. Helm v. Superior
Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 367 P.2d 6 (1961); Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Schindler v. Superior
Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 327 P.2d 68 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Walker
v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 134, 317 P.2d 130 (3d Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); State
ex Tel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957); People
v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960); In re
Di Joseph's Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958); State ex Tel.
Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932); State v.
Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
101 Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); Mendelsohn v.
People, 143 Colo. 397, 353 P.2d 587 (1960); Kinder v. Commonwealth,
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because trial judges never allow such inspection and the appellate
courts will not interfere,1 0 2 or because it would take an exceptional
case to allow discovery. 0 3 Florida has a specific statute authorizing
a defendant to attend the examination of such things as blood,
semen or bullets, but this section has been strictly construed. 04
A small minority of the states, therefore, allow pretrial dis-
covery of essential scientific reports that may be the core of the
state's case. One article mentioned, however, that because several
states have not decided the question, prosecutors in those states
must often allow a defendant to inspect such items without court
compulsion; 0 5 this contention is of doubtful validity when the over-
all attitude of many of the states is considered.
(3) Statements of Other Witnesses
Few states authorize a defendant to inspect the statements of
prosecution witnesses. Eleven states faced with the exact question
have completely denied the right. 0 6 New Jersey, which has taken
a very liberal position on confessions, has admitted that it is not
yet ready to authorize pretrial inspection of other witnesses.107
279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1955); Ivey v. State, 207 Tenn. 438, 340 S.W.2d
907 (1960) ; Bass v. State, 191 Tenn. 259, 231 S.W.2d 707 (1950) ; Freeman
v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317 S.W.2d 726 (1958); Pettigrew v. State,
163 Tex. Crim. 194, 289 S.W.2d 935 (1956).
102 Lander v. State, 230 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958); Parker v. State,
164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957); Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504, 56
N.W.2d 734 (1953); Hameyer v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458(1947); Fisher v. State, 140 Neb. 216, 299 N.W. 501 (1941); Marshall v.
State, 116 Neb. 45, 215 N.W. 564 (1927); Pinana v. State, 352 P.2d 824(Nev. 1960); State v. Potts, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 77, 124 N.E.2d 180 (Ct. App.
1953).
103 State ex rel. Keast v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959);
State ex rel. Regan v. Superior Court, 102 N.H. 224, 153 A.2d 403 (1959).
104 Supra note 68.
105 Comment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940,
1061 (1961).
106 Mabry v. State, 40 Ala. App. 129, 110 So. 2d 250 (1959); State v. Zim-
naruk, 128 Conn. 124, 20 A.2d 613 (1941); Russom v. State, 105 So. 2d380 (Fla. 1958); Urga v. State, 104 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1958); Walker v. State,215 Ga. 128, 104 S.E.2d 748 (1959); Kinder v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.2d
782 (Ky. 1955); State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954); Mat-
tox v. State, 137 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1962); Bellew v. State, 238 Miss. 734,
106 So. 2d 146 (1958), appeal dismissed, 360 U.S. 473 (1958); Anderson v.
State, 207 Tenn. 486, 341 S.W.2d 385 (1960); Hill v. State, 167 Tex. Crim.
229, 319 S.W.2d 318 (1958); State v. Lavallee, 122 Vt. 75, 163 A.2d 856(1960); State ex rel. Byrne v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 16 Wis. 2d
197, 114 N.W.2d 114 (1962).
107 State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
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The New Jersey court suggested that the question should be sub-
mitted to the state judicial conference for analysis. 08 In a recent
case,10 9 Arizona also refused to answer the question of whether a
defendant can inspect the statements of other witnesses. It did
state, however, that it is up to the trial court to decide whether de-
fendant can inspect a statement made by a co-defendant. Illinois
and Michigan have left the entire question to the discretion of the
trial judge." 0 The only state that has developed much law on this
question is California. In California, a defendant can get a pre-
trial disclosure of the name of an informer as a matter of right upon
some showing of necessity."' He can also get the statement of any
witness on showing of need." 2 Little showing of need is apparently
necessary, but mere blanket requests for all statements without suf-
ficient reason have been denied." 3
California undoubtedly leads the way in liberal pretrial dis-
covery. The question now is whether other jurisdictions (includ-
ing federal courts) will soon follow this lead. Many states have
already indicated a desire to reject the old, misplaced fears of per-
jury and imbalance, and have recognized that defendants need
pretrial inspection to adequately prepare their defense. An ex-
amination of the Nebraska position is now in order.
V. THE NEBRASKA LAW ON PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
In Nebraska, the question of pretrial discovery in criminal- cases
has seldom been raised." 4 The Nebraska law can be summarized
as follows: Whether or not a defendant can get pretrial disclosure
108 Id. at 143, 145 A.2d at 319.
109 State v. McGee, 370 P.2d 261 (Ariz. 1962).
110 People v. Wolff, 19 Ill. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960); People v. Moses,
11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957); People v. Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 102
N.W.2d 568 (1960).
111 Castiel v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. 2d 710, 328 P.2d 476 (1958); Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 837, 330 P.2d 48 (1958) ; Tupper v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. 2d 263, 331 P.2d 977 (1958).
112 People v. Lane, 56 Cal. 2d 759, 366 P.2d 57 (1961); Vetter v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 890, 189 Cal. App. 2d 132 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959); Vance v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773 (1958); Cash v. Superior
Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959).
13 People v. Cooper, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964 (1960).
114 There have only been seven cases in Nebraska on pretrial discovery.
Two, Reizenstein v. State, 165 Neb. 865, 87 N.W.2d 560 (1958), and
Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944), dealt with requests
for confessions. Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957),
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rests solely with the discretion of the trial judge, and even if abuse
is shown, the trial judge will not be overruled unless the defendant
can show substantial prejudice.115 It is interesting to note that in
not one case has a trial judge authorized inspection. For some time,
there was a feeling that the Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure ap-
plied to criminal cases, but this feeling has now been laid to rest.116
The Nebraska position is probably best illustrated by the statement
of Judge Carter in Cramer v. State:117
We do not appear to have passed directly upon the respective rights
of the parties in a matter of this kind. We think that when a prose-
cution is based upon a written instrument, as in a forgery case, the
defendant is entitled to inspect and make copies of such instrument
under such conditions as the trial court may prescribe. If a prosecu-
tion is based upon the correctness or incorrectness of certain records,
such as is ofttimes the case in a prosecution for embezzlement,
the examination of such records by defendant should be granted.
But as to all statements and documents not admissible in evidence in
chief and obtained for impeachment or other purpose not going
to the merits, the defendant has no basis for demanding an inspec-
tion of them. As to the rights of a defendant to demand an inspec-
tion or a copy of a written confession made by him, the authorities
do not seem to be in accord. The rule generally is that a confession
need not be so produced. However, we think the trial court should
order a written confession produced where the interests of justice
so require. If there be a question whether the signature thereto
is forged, or if the written confession is necessary to a proper
determination of the mental condition of the defendant at the time
the confession was made, or for other reasons which tend toward
establishing the merits of the litigation, we are of the opinion that
such an application should be allowed. Where the only reason for
the production of a written confession for the inspection of a de-
fendant is that it would aid generally in preparing of the defense,
no basis exists for requiring the state to produce it. The defense
concerned a request for the contents of a stomach. Linder v. State, 156
Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734 (1953), dealt with the request for a medical
examination report. Hameyer v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458
(1947), Fisher v. State, 140 Neb. 216, 299 N.W. 501 (1947), and Marshall
v. State, 116 Neb. 45, 215 N.W. 564 (1927) all involved requests for
records or documents that were the basis of the charge. These cases are
all considered in detail in a note, Criminal Discovery Practice in Ne-
braska, 34 NEB. L. REV. 645 (1955) so they will not be thoroughly dis-
cussed here.
115 The best discussions of this rule can be found in Cramer v. State, 145
Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944), and Reizenstein v. State, 165 Neb. 865,
87 N.W.2d 560 (1958).
116 Hameyer v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947). To see the argu-
ments made for applying the Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure to
criminal cases see Note, Criminal Discovery Practice in Nebraska, 34
NEB. L. REV. 645 (1955).
117 145 Neb. 88, 94-95, 15 N.W.2d 323, 327 (1944).
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counsel in a criminal prosecution have no right to inspect or com-
pel the production of evidence in the possession of the state unless
a valid reason exists for so doing. The defendant has no inherent
right to invoke this means of examining the state's evidence
merely in the hope that something may be uncovered which would
aid his defense. In the administration of these rules the trial
court has a broad judicial discretion and it is only when such
discretion is abused that error can be based thereon.
Cramer has been cited by subsequent cases holding that an
abuse of discretion was not shown and, thus, there was no error.118
It seems apparent, therefore, that the Nebraska Supreme Court is
not willing to take the initiative in creating a more liberal discovery
procedure, and it is doubtful that trial judges will do so either be-
cause they have no real precedent authorizing them to take such
steps. The only answer seems to be action by the legislature
authorizing pretrial discovery in criminal cases. Nebraska should
recognize, as many states have already, that discovery will increase
the probability that verdicts will be based on the facts rather than
on clever trial maneuvers, and that the fears of liberal discovery
have already been discredited. The only possible harm which may
exist is the chance that discovery of statements of other witnesses
may result in the coercion of those witnesses to perjure themselves.
But this would happen very rarely, and the statute could protect
against this possibility by instructing a trial judge to deny such
discovery when the public interest so requires. Confessions and
scientific reports or tests should be made discoverable by statute
as a matter of right unless some unusual circumstances exist, which
the state should be required to prove. No harm has ever been
shown in allowing such discovery, and the value would rest in
allowing a defendant to adequately prepare himself for a trial in
which he may lose his life. It must always be kept in mind that a
criminal case is not a contest of wits and tactics between the
defendant and the state."9 Justice dictates that a defendant be
given every possible opportunity to prepare his case and prove his
innocence.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article, after posing a hypothetical situa-
tion, the following question was asked: Should Ralph Defendant
be allowed to inspect his own confession, the FBI reports or the
items examined, and the statement of a prosecution witness prior
118 See cases cited in note 107 supra.
119 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1845 (3d ed. 1940).
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to trial? I have attempted to show throughout the article that
Defendant should be allowed this discovery as a matter of right
unless some supervening public policy would clearly prohibit it.
The state of the law generally, however, is opposed to this point of
view. Since the law in the majority of the jurisdictions is based on
an archaic concept of the rights of a defendant in a criminal case,
it is here suggested that pretrial discovery is essential in order to
guarantee a defendant a fair trial. The following statute is pro-
posed, therefore, in hopes that it will stimulate some thought among
the various legislative bodies, and eventual legislative action.1 20
MODEL PRETRIAL DISCOVERY STATUTE
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of
the indictment or information, the court shall order the attorney
for the government to permit the inspection or copying or photo-
graphing of any designated documents, including written state-
ments or confessions made by a defendant or a codefendant (and
written statements of witnesses), papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, grand jury minutes and exhibits, and tangible objects
not privileged, upon a showing that the items sought may be ma-
terial to the preparation of his defense and that the request is
otherwise reasonable. The court, in its discretion, may deny a
request for inspection if a showing is made that such inspection
would be detrimental to the public interest.
120 For other proposals see, The Problem of Discovery in Criminal Cases,
Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law
Institute and American Bar Association (1961).
